Here's a comprehensive plan to achieve your goal of creating a statutory trust-based tokenization system, onboarding partners, implementing smart contracts, and utilizing NFTs while maximizing global exposure:
Timeline:
Each Law office, or client is determined exempt or not. There is a choice. Non exemptions pose significant increases in waiting time due to the backlog of the regulatoiry bodies.
The U.S. Supreme Court's Howey case and subsequent case law have found that an "investment contract" exists when there is the investment of money in a common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the efforts of others.[5] The so-called "Howey test" applies to any contract, scheme, or transaction, regardless of whether it has any of the characteristics of typical securities.[6] The focus of the Howey analysis is not only on the form and terms of the instrument itself (in this case, the digital asset) but also on the circumstances surrounding the digital asset and the manner in which it is offered, sold, or resold (which includes secondary market sales). Therefore, issuers and other persons and entities engaged in the marketing, offer, sale, resale, or distribution of any digital asset will need to analyze the relevant transactions to determine if the federal securities laws apply.
The federal securities laws require all offers and sales of securities, including those involving a digital asset, to either be registered under its provisions or to qualify for an exemption from registration. The registration provisions require persons to disclose certain information to investors, and that information must be complete and not materially misleading. This requirement for disclosure furthers the federal securities laws' goal of providing investors with the information necessary to make informed investment decisions. Among the information that must be disclosed is information relating to the essential managerial efforts that affect the success of the enterprise.[7] This is true in the case of a corporation, for example, but also may be true for other types of enterprises regardless of their organizational structure or form.[8] Absent the disclosures required by law about those efforts and the progress and prospects of the enterprise, significant informational asymmetries may exist between the management and promoters of the enterprise on the one hand, and investors and prospective investors on the other hand. The reduction of these information asymmetries through required disclosures protects investors and is one of the primary purposes of the federal securities laws.
The following characteristics are especially relevant in an analysis of whether the third prong of the Howey test is satisfied.
The inquiry into whether a purchaser is relying on the efforts of others focuses on two key issues:
Although no one of the following characteristics is necessarily determinative, the stronger their presence, the more likely it is that a purchaser of a digital asset is relying on the "efforts of others": Each class of cases that are tokenized, create a seperate smart contract.
In evaluating whether a digital asset previously sold as a security should be reevaluated at the time of later offers or sales, there would be additional considerations as they relate to the "efforts of others," including but not limited to:
An evaluation of the digital asset should also consider whether there is a reasonable expectation of profits. Profits can be, among other things, capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment or business enterprise or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of purchasers' funds.[18] Price appreciation resulting solely from external market forces (such as general inflationary trends or the economy) impacting the supply and demand for an underlying asset generally is not considered "profit" under the Howey test.
The more the following characteristics are present, the more likely it is that there is a reasonable expectation of profit:
In evaluating whether a digital asset previously sold as a security should be reevaluated at the time of later offers or sales, there would be additional considerations as they relate to the "reasonable expectation of profits," including but not limited to:
When assessing whether there is a reasonable expectation of profit derived from the efforts of others, federal courts look to the economic reality of the transaction.[20] In doing so, the courts also have considered whether the instrument is offered and sold for use or consumption by purchasers.[21]
Although no one of the following characteristics of use or consumption is necessarily determinative, the stronger their presence, the less likely the Howey test is met:
Digital assets with these types of use or consumption characteristics are less likely to be investment contracts. For example, take the case of an online retailer with a fully-developed operating business. The retailer creates a digital asset to be used by consumers to purchase products only on the retailer's network, offers the digital asset for sale in exchange for real currency, and the digital asset is redeemable for products commensurately priced in that real currency. The retailer continues to market its products to its existing customer base, advertises its digital asset payment method as part of those efforts, and may "reward" customers with digital assets based on product purchases. Upon receipt of the digital asset, consumers immediately are able to purchase products on the network using the digital asset. The digital assets are not transferable; rather, consumers can only use them to purchase products from the retailer or sell them back to the retailer at a discount to the original purchase price. Under these facts, the digital asset would not be an investment contract.
Even in cases where a digital asset can be used to purchase goods or services on a network, where that network's or digital asset's functionality is being developed or improved, there may be securities transactions if, among other factors, the following is present: the digital asset is offered or sold to purchasers at a discount to the value of the goods or services; the digital asset is offered or sold to purchasers in quantities that exceed reasonable use; and/or there are limited or no restrictions on reselling those digital assets, particularly where an AP is continuing in its efforts to increase the value of the digital assets or has facilitated a secondary market.
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[1] This framework represents the views of the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology ("FinHub," the "Staff," or "we") of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission"). It is not a rule, regulation, or statement of the Commission, and the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content. Further, this framework does not replace or supersede existing case law, legal requirements, or statements or guidance from the Commission or Staff. Rather, the framework provides additional guidance in the areas that the Commission or Staff has previously addressed. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO (Exchange Act Rel. No. 81207) (July 25, 2017) ("The DAO Report"); William Hinman, Digital Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto (June 14, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418.
[2] The term "digital asset," as used in this framework, refers to an asset that is issued and transferred using distributed ledger or blockchain technology, including, but not limited to, so-called "virtual currencies," "coins," and "tokens."
[3] The term "security" is defined in Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 2(a)(36) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and Section 202(a)(18) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
[4] This framework is intended to be instructive and is based on the Staff's experiences to date and relevant law and legal precedent. It is not an exhaustive treatment of the legal and regulatory issues relevant to conducting an analysis of whether a product is a security, including an investment contract analysis with respect to digital assets generally. We expect that analysis concerning digital assets as securities may evolve over time as the digital asset market matures. Also, no one factor is necessarily dispositive as to whether or not an investment contract exists.
[5] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) ("Howey"). See also United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) ("Forman"); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) ("Tcherepnin"); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) ("Joiner").
[6] Whether a contract, scheme, or transaction is an investment contract is a matter of federal, not state, law and does not turn on whether there is a formal contract between parties. Rather, under the Howey test, "form [is] disregarded for substance and the emphasis [is] on economic reality." Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. The Supreme Court has further explained that that the term security "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle" in order to meet the "variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." Id. at 299.
[7] Issuers of digital assets, like all issuers, must provide full and fair disclosure of material information consistent with the requirements of the federal securities laws. Issuers of digital assets should be guided by the regulatory framework and concepts of materiality. What is material depends upon the nature and structure of the issuer's particular network and circumstances. See TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (a fact is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment decision or if it "would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available" to the shareholder).
[8] See The DAO Report.
[9] The lack of monetary consideration for digital assets, such as those distributed via a so-called "bounty program" does not mean that the investment of money prong is not satisfied. As the Commission explained in The DAO Report, "[i]n determining whether an investment contract exists, the investment of 'money' need not take the form of cash" and "in spite of Howey's reference to an 'investment of money,' it is well established that cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will create an investment contract." The DAO Report at 11 (citation omitted). See In re Tomahawk Exploration LLC, Securities Act Rel. 10530 (Aug. 14, 2018) (issuance of tokens under a so-called "bounty program" constituted an offer and sale of securities because the issuer provided tokens to investors in exchange for services designed to advance the issuer's economic interests and foster a trading market for its securities). Further, the lack of monetary consideration for digital assets, such as those distributed via a so-called "air drop," does not mean that the investment of money prong is not satisfied; therefore, an airdrop may constitute a sale or distribution of securities. In a so-called "airdrop," a digital asset is distributed to holders of another digital asset, typically to promote its circulation.
[10] In order to satisfy the "common enterprise" aspect of the Howey test, federal courts require that there be either "horizontal commonality" or "vertical commonality." See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d. 81, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing horizontal commonality as "the tying of each individual investor's fortunes to the fortunes of the other investors by the pooling of assets, usually combined with the pro-rata distribution of profits" and two variants of vertical commonality, which focus "on the relationship between the promoter and the body of investors"). The Commission, on the other hand, does not require vertical or horizontal commonality per se, nor does it view a "common enterprise" as a distinct element of the term "investment contract." In re Barkate, 57 S.E.C. 488, 496 n.13 (Apr. 8, 2004); see also the Commission's Supplemental Brief at 14 in SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004) (on remand to the 11th Circuit).
[11] Based on our experiences to date, investments in digital assets have constituted investments in a common enterprise because the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have been linked to each other or to the success of the promoter's efforts. See SEC v. Int'l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
[12] Howey, 328 U.S. at 298. See also Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336 ("in searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the [Acts], form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.")
[13] Joiner, 320 U.S. at 352-53.
[14] SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821, 94 S. Ct. 117, 38 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1973) ("Turner").
[15] In this guidance, we are using the term "network" broadly to encompass the various elements that comprise a digital asset's network, enterprise, platform, or application.
[16] We recognize that holders of digital assets may put forth some effort in the operations of the network, but those efforts do not negate the fact that the holders of digital assets are relying on the efforts of the AP. That a scheme assigns "nominal or limited responsibilities to the [investor] does not negate the existence of an investment contract." SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 483 n.15 (5th Cir. 1974) (citation and quotation marks omitted). If the AP provides efforts that are "the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise," and the AP is not merely performing ministerial or routine tasks, then there likely is an investment contract. See Turner, 474 U.S. at 482; see also The DAO Report (although DAO token holders had certain voting rights, they nonetheless reasonably relied on the managerial efforts of others). Managerial and entrepreneurial efforts typically are characterized as involving expertise and decision-making that impacts the success of the business or enterprise through the application of skill and judgment.
[17] See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, 756 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985).
[18] See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
[19] Situations where the digital asset is exchangeable or redeemable solely for goods or services within the network or on a platform, and may not otherwise be transferred or sold, may more likely be a payment for a good or service in which the purchaser is motivated to use or consume the digital asset. See discussion of "Other Relevant Considerations."
[20] As noted above, under Howey, courts conduct an objective inquiry focused on the transaction itself and the manner in which it is offered.
[21] See Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53 (where a purchaser is not "'attracted solely by the prospects of a return' on his investment . . . [but] is motivated by a desire to use or consume the item purchased . . . the securities laws do not apply.").
Regulations, Risks, Not Investment Advice
At the end of 2022, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Market Characteristics, Data and Trends. Defining third-party litigation financing or funding (TPLF) as “an arrangement in which a funder who is not a party to the lawsuit agrees to help fund it,” the investigative arm of Congress looked at the global multibillion-dollar industry, which is raising concerns among insurers and some lawmakers.
The GAO findings summarize emerging trends, challenges for market participants, and the regulatory landscape, primarily focusing on the years between 2017 and 2021.
Why a regulatory lens on TPLF is important
The agency conducted this research to study gaps in public information about the industry’s practices and examine transparency and disclosure concerns. Three Republican Congress members – Sen. Chuck Grassley (IA), Rep. Andy Barr (KY), and Rep. Darrell Issa (CA) — led the call for this undertaking.
However, as GAO exists to serve the entire Congress, it is expected to be independent and nonpartisan in its work. While insurers, TPLF insiders, and other stakeholders, including Triple-I, have researched the industry (to the extent that research on such a secretive industry is possible), the legislative-based agency is well positioned to apply a regulatory perspective.
Example of Third-Party Litigation Financing for Plaintiffs
The report methodology involved several components, many of which other researchers have applied, such as analysis of publicly available industry data, reviews of existing scholarship, legislation, and court rules. GAO probed further by convening a roundtable of 12 experts “selected to represent a mix of reviews and professional fields, among other factors,” and interviewing litigation funders and industry stakeholders. Nonetheless, like researchers before them, GAO faced a lack of public data on the industry.
Third-party litigation funding practices differ between the consumer and the commercial markets. Comparatively smaller loan amounts are at play for consumer cases. The types of clients, use of funds, and financial arrangements can also vary, even within each market.
While most published discussions of TPLF center on TPLF going to plaintiffs, as this appears from public data to be the norm, GAO findings indicate: 1) funders may finance defendants in certain scenarios and 2) lawyers may use TPLF to support their work for defense and plaintiff clients.
Based on the provided statutes and case law, an NFT (non-fungible token) would not be subject to CFTC regulations or registration requirements if it is traded in a cash or "spot" market. The CFTC does not have regulatory jurisdiction over markets or platforms conducting cash or "spot" transactions in virtual currencies or other commodities, including NFTs, nor over participants on such platforms CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213.
However, the CFTC does have enforcement jurisdiction to investigate and conduct civil enforcement actions against fraud and manipulation in virtual currency derivatives markets and in underlying virtual currency spot markets CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213. Therefore, while NFTs themselves are not subject to CFTC regulations or registration requirements, activities involving NFTs that constitute fraud or manipulation could fall under the CFTC's enforcement jurisdiction.
This compliance guide is divided into the following parts:
Under the Securities Act of 1933, the offer and sale of securities must be registered unless an exemption from registration is available. Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 added Securities Act Section 4(a)(6) that provides an exemption from registration for certain crowdfunding transactions.[2] In 2015, the Commission adopted Regulation Crowdfunding to implement the requirements of Title III.[3] Under the rules, eligible companies will be allowed to raise capital using Regulation Crowdfunding starting May 16, 2016.
In order to rely on the Regulation Crowdfunding exemption, certain requirements must be met.
A company issuing securities in reliance on Regulation Crowdfunding (an “issuer”) is permitted to raise a maximum aggregate amount of $1,070,000 in a 12-month period. In determining the amount that may be sold in a particular offering, an issuer should count:
An issuer does not aggregate amounts sold in other exempt (non-crowdfunding) offerings during the preceding 12-month period for purposes of determining the amount that may be sold in a particular Regulation Crowdfunding offering.
Individual investors are limited in the amounts they are allowed to invest in all Regulation Crowdfunding offerings over the course of a 12-month period:
Spouses are allowed to calculate their net worth and annual income jointly. This chart illustrates a few examples of the investment limits:
Investor
Annual IncomeInvestor
Net WorthCalculationInvestment Limit[4]$30,000$105,000Greater of $2,200 or 5% of $30,000 ($1,500)$2,200$150,000$80,000Greater of $2,200 or 5% of $80,000 ($4,000)$4,000$150,000$107,00010% of $107,000 ($10,700)$10,700$200,000$900,00010% of $200,000 ($20,000)$20,000$1,200,000$2,000,00010% of $1,200,000 ($120,000), subject to $107,000 cap$107,000
Each Regulation Crowdfunding offering must be exclusively conducted through one online platform. The intermediary operating the platform must be a broker-dealer or a funding portal that is registered with the SEC and FINRA.
Issuers may rely on the efforts of the intermediary to determine that the aggregate amount of securities purchased by an investor does not cause the investor to exceed the investment limits, so long as the issuer does not have knowledge that the investor would exceed the investment limits as a result of purchasing securities in the issuer’s offering.
Certain companies are not eligible to use the Regulation Crowdfunding exemption. These include:
Any issuer conducting a Regulation Crowdfunding offering must electronically file its offering statement on Form C through the Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system and with the intermediary facilitating the crowdfunding offering. A Form C cover page will be generated when the issuer provides information in XML-based fillable text boxes on the EDGAR system. Other required disclosure that is not requested in the XML text boxes must be filed as attachments to Form C. There is not a specific presentation format required for the attachments to Form C; however, the form does include an optional “Question and Answer” format that issuers may use to provide the disclosures that are required but not included in the XML portion.
The instructions to Form C indicate the information that an issuer must disclose, including:
The financial statements requirements are based on the amount offered and sold in reliance on Regulation Crowdfunding within the preceding 12-month period:
For any offering that has not yet been completed or terminated, an issuer can file on Form C/A an amendment to its offering statement to disclose changes, additions or updates to information. An amendment is required for changes, additions or updates that are material, and in those required instances the issuer must reconfirm outstanding investment commitments within 5 business days, or the investor’s commitment will be considered cancelled.
An issuer must provide an update on its progress toward meeting the target offering amount within 5 business days after reaching 50% and 100% of its target offering amount. These updates will be filed on Form C-U. If the issuer will accept proceeds over the target offering amount, it also must file a final Form C-U reflecting the total amount of securities sold in the offering. If, however, the intermediary provides frequent updates on its platform regarding the progress of the issuer in meeting the target offering amount, then the issuer will need to file only a final Form C-U to disclose the total amount of securities sold in the offering.
An issuer that sold securities in a Regulation Crowdfunding offering is required to provide an annual report on Form C-AR no later than 120 days after the end of its fiscal year. The report must be filed on EDGAR and posted on the issuer’s website. The annual report requires information similar to what is required in the offering statement, although neither an audit nor a review of the financial statements is required. Issuers must comply with the annual reporting requirement until one of the following occurs:
Any issuer terminating its annual reporting obligations is required to file notice on Form C-TR reporting that it will no longer provide annual reports pursuant to the requirements of Regulation Crowdfunding.
An issuer may not advertise the terms of a Regulation Crowdfunding offering except in a notice that directs investors to the intermediary’s platform and includes no more than the following information:
Although advertising the terms of the offering off of the intermediary’s platform is limited to a brief notice, an issuer may communicate with investors and potential investors about the terms of the offering through communication channels provided on the intermediary’s platform. An issuer must identify itself as the issuer and persons acting on behalf of the issuer must identify their affiliation with the issuer in all communications on the intermediary’s platform.
An issuer is allowed to compensate others to promote its crowdfunding offerings through communication channels provided by an intermediary, but only if the issuer takes reasonable steps to ensure that the promoter clearly discloses the compensation with each communication.
Securities purchased in a crowdfunding transaction generally cannot be resold for a period of one year, unless the securities are transferred:
Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act requires an issuer with total assets of more than $10 million and a class of securities held of record by either 2,000 persons, or 500 persons who are not accredited investors, to register that class of securities with the Commission. However, securities issued pursuant to Regulation Crowdfunding are conditionally exempted from the record holder count under Section 12(g) if the following conditions are met:
As a result, Section 12(g) registration is required if an issuer has, on the last day of its fiscal year, total assets greater than $25 million and the class of equity securities is held by more than 2,000 persons, or 500 persons who are not accredited investors. In that circumstance, an issuer is granted a two-year transition period before it is required to register its class of securities pursuant to Section 12(g), so long as it timely files all of the annual reports required by Regulation Crowdfunding during such period.
An issuer seeking to exclude a person from the record holder count of Section 12(g) is responsible for demonstrating that the securities held by the person were initially issued in an offering made under Section 4(a)(6).
Rule 503 of Regulation Crowdfunding includes “bad actor” disqualification provisions that disqualify offerings if the issuer or other “covered persons” have experienced a disqualifying event, such as being convicted of, or subject to court or administrative sanctions for, securities fraud or other violations of specified laws.
Understanding the categories of persons that are covered by Rule 503 is important because issuers are required to conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether any covered person has had a disqualifying event, and the existence of such an event will generally disqualify the offering from reliance on Regulation Crowdfunding.
“Covered persons” include:
Under the final rule, disqualifying events include:
Many disqualifying events include a look-back period (for example, a court injunction that was issued within the last five years or a regulatory order that was issued within the last ten years). The look-back period is measured from the date of the disqualifying event – for example, the issuance of the injunction or regulatory order and not the date of the underlying conduct that led to the disqualifying event – to the date of the filing of an offering statement.
Disqualification will not arise as a result of disqualifying events relating to any conviction, order, judgment, decree, suspension, expulsion or bar that occurred before May 16, 2016, the effective date of Regulation Crowdfunding. Matters that existed before the effective date of Regulation Crowdfunding, are still within the relevant look-back period, and would otherwise be disqualifying are, however, required to be disclosed in the issuer’s offering statement.
Regulation Crowdfunding provides an exception from disqualification when the issuer is able to demonstrate that it did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known that a covered person with a disqualifying event participated in the offering.
The steps an issuer should take to exercise reasonable care will vary according to particular facts and circumstances. An instruction to the rule states that an issuer will not be able to establish that it has exercised reasonable care unless it has made, in light of the circumstances, factual inquiry into whether any disqualifications exist.
Disqualification will not arise if, before the filing of the offering statement, the court or regulatory authority that entered the relevant order, judgment or decree advises in writing – whether in the relevant judgment, order or decree or separately to the Commission or its staff – that disqualification under Regulation Crowdfunding should not arise as a consequence of such order, judgment or decree.
Regulation Crowdfunding also provides for the ability to seek waivers from disqualification by the Commission upon a showing of good cause that it is not necessary under the circumstances that the exemption be denied.
The adopting release Regulation Crowdfunding can be found on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf.
Regulation Crowdfunding (17 CFR 227.100 et seq.) can be accessed through the “Corporation Finance” section of the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ecfrlinks.shtml.
You can also submit complaints or tips about possible securities laws violations on the SEC’s questions and complaints page at http://www.sec.gov/complaint.shtml.
The SEC staff is happy to assist with questions regarding Regulation Crowdfunding. For issuer questions, you may contact the Division of Corporation Finance's Office of Small Business Policy using this online request form at or by telephone at (202) 551-3460. For intermediary questions, you may contact the Division of Trading and Markets, Office of Chief Counsel, at (202) 551-5777, or search for your answer in the Small Business Compliance Guide for Intermediaries.
[1] This guide was prepared by the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) as a “small entity compliance guide” under Section 212 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, as amended. The guide summarizes and explains the rules adopted by the SEC, but is not a substitute for any rule itself. Only the rule itself can provide complete and definitive information regarding its requirements.[2] Crowdfunding is a relatively new and evolving method of using the Internet to raise capital to support a wide range of ideas and ventures. An entity or individual raising funds through crowdfunding typically seeks small individual contributions from a large number of people. Individuals interested in the crowdfunding campaign – members of the “crowd” – may share information about the project, cause, idea or business with each other and use the information to decide whether to fund the campaign based on the collective “wisdom of the crowd.”[3] The Regulation Crowdfunding adopting release is available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf. The March 31, 2017 release adopting inflation adjustments to the dollar amount thresholds in Regulation Crowdfunding is available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2017/33-10332.pdf. The staff has also issued a small entity compliance guide concerning registration of funding portals, which is available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/tmcompliance/fpregistrationguide.htm.[4] This “Investment Limit” column reflects the aggregate investment limit across all Regulation Crowdfunding offerings within a 12-month period.
Last Reviewed or Updated: April 5, 2017
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